The Father of QE3

Now that QE3 is nearly upon us, it is worth understanding the rationale behind it from the man responsible for developing the views of policymakers. Tyler Cowen, the man responsible for giving prominence to his ideas declared September 13 "Scott Sumner Day" after the US Federal Reserve announced that it would engage in a third round of quantitative easing. Here is the man responsible for this new course of action by the Fed:

Opposite Poles

Two eminent economists, Meltzer and Krugman, dispute the issue of whether inflation or deflation will be the next great challenge facing the US (and world) economy. A lot depends on which period of history is used as an analogue for this one.

Allan H. Meltzer is a professor of political economy at Carnegie Mellon University. He has authored the book “A History of the Federal Reserve.” He believes that the US is headed for “severe inflation”. In an op-ed piece for the NY Times, he points out that

the interest rate the Fed controls is nearly zero; and the enormous increase in bank reserves — caused by the Fed’s purchases of bonds and mortgages — will surely bring on severe inflation if allowed to remain (Inflation Nation, 3 May 2009).

He pins the blame on both political and monetary authorities, in particular

the (doubtful) commitment of the administration and the (lack of) autonomy of the Federal Reserve ... under Mr. Bernanke, the Fed has sacrificed its independence and become the monetary arm of the Treasury: bailing out A.I.G., taking on illiquid securities from Bear Stearns and promising to provide as much as $700 billion of reserves to buy mortgages.…
It doesn’t help that the administration’s stimulus program is an obstacle to sound policy. It will create jobs at the cost of an enormous increase in the government debt that has to be financed. And it does very little to increase productivity, which is the main engine of economic growth.

Meltzer recounts the Fed under Paul Volcker (who is presently advising the Obama administration) which tamed spiralling inflation following the Oil Shock of the 1970s. As some have argued, the present crisis could have been instigated and deepened by the Oil Shock of 2007. Meltzer further points to one indicator that inflation is already here; he argues

(S)ome of my fellow economists, including many at the Fed … point to the less than 1 percent decline in the consumer price index for the year ending in March as evidence that deflation is a threat. But this statistic is misleading: unstable food and energy prices may lower the price index for a few months, but deflation (or inflation) refers to the sustained rate of change of prices, not the price level (emphasis mine). We should look instead at a less volatile price index, the gross domestic product deflator. In this year’s first quarter, it rose 2.9 percent — a sure sign of inflation.

Quoting the father of monetarism, he says

Milton Friedman often said that “inflation was always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon.” The members of the Federal Reserve seem to dismiss this theory because they concentrate excessively on the near term and almost never discuss the medium- and long-term consequences of their actions.

Paul Krugman is on the opposing side of the debate. He teaches at Princeton University and has made a living out of studying economic crises. His latest book is entitled “The Return of Depression Economics.” He counters Meltzer in his blog with a graph that depicts the “lost decade” in Japan in the 1990s where the growth of money supply, high deficits coincided with deflation. Krugman’s attention is devoted to avoiding wage deflation, as he writes in his column for the NY Times that

…according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, the average cost of employing workers in the private sector rose only two-tenths of a percent in the first quarter of this year — the lowest increase on record. Since the job market is still getting worse, it wouldn’t be at all surprising if overall wages started falling later this year (Falling Wage Syndrome, 3 May 2009).

His view is that wage deflation is a symptom of a deeper problem in the economy. And his prescription is for “more stimulus, more decisive action on the banks, more job creation”. Quoting the father of stimulus economics, he argues that

(T)hings get even worse if businesses and consumers expect wages to fall further in the future. John Maynard Keynes put it clearly, more than 70 years ago: “The effect of an expectation that wages are going to sag by, say, 2 percent in the coming year will be roughly equivalent to the effect of a rise of 2 percent in the amount of interest payable for the same period.” And a rise in the effective interest rate is the last thing this economy needs.

So there you have it: two renowned experts fighting over the appropriate fiscal and monetary measures to take in this crisis. Both use staitstics and history to bolster their arguments. The disagreement ultimately comes from which previous recession is deemed relevant for this present crisis – whether the Great Depression of the 1920s and lost decade in Japan of the 1990s or the post-Oil Shock era of the 1970s.

Krugman and Bernanke, the deficit hawks, believe that constricting growth particularly at this moment could hamper economic recovery, while Meltzer, the institutionalist, believes that protecting growth at all costs has consequences far greater than we imagine.

New Expectations in Monetary Policy

The ridiculous entries in Lolfed.com and reactions it receives (from Paul Krugman no less) demonstrate the decline in confidence that Americans have come to regard both the US Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke and Treasury Sec. Hank Paulson with. So much so that the unexpected announcement by the Obama transition team of the appointment of a new treasury chief in the person of current NY Reserve President Timothy Geithner was all that was needed to generate a much needed lift late Friday after a near disastrous week on Wall Street.

Here in Australia, the monetary and fiscal authorities have been keen to do a similar two step as the Americans with the same limited effect. Back in May of this year, the RBA was put under scrutiny over its decision to raise interest rates. Having shown its audacity in doing so during the election season that toppled the Howard government, it was given the imprimatur by Treasurer Wayne Swan who in declaring a war against inflation since taking office set the tone for monetary and fiscal policy to be on coordinated footing.

It didn't matter that Joseph Stiglitz, a Nobel Prize winning economist had been appearing on local TV regarding the Australian situation on inflation and the policy on inflation targeting which he predicted would be abandoned within five years because of its inefficacy to deal with the importation of inflation through petrol and food prices.

The defense that it was the commodities driven terms of trade boom generating price inflation notwithstanding, the oracle of Stiglitz has been proven true in less than six months with the higher than anticipated RBA cut of 100 basis points and further cuts in the offing, despite inflation exceeding the upper band of the 2 to 3 percent range. Why is it then that macroeconomic policy makers often fail to get their settings right?

Could it be that they are still operating under a misguided view of the world that sees agents as purely rational? To what extent do adaptive rather than rational expectations play a role in resolving the problem?