What the Marcos victory heralds

Image courtesy of PNA, June 2022.

The New Society under Pres. Ferdinand E. Marcos sought to break with the Commonwealth era, by dispossessing the old aristocracy who were in charge of that order and replacing them with his own cronies and political acolytes. State-led development using financial leverage supplied by the West was its economic growth model. This was made possible by various policy settings prevalent at the time.

The Marcos regime operated state owned enterprises in nearly every sector of the economy. It had a fixed exchange rate with the peso pegged to the US dollar. It sought to develop industries behind protectionist trade walls. It had a central wage fixing system that was politically manipulable. Foreign investment was confined to a short positive list, set by his government. The tax regime was highly irrational and regressive.

This was reformed by the EDSA regime, which subscribed to Washington’s neoliberal agenda. State-led development gave way to market-centrism. State-owned enterprises were privatised. Crony capitalists were left to fend for themselves. A flexible foreign exchange rate regime was introduced. Quantitative trade restrictions were converted into tariffs, which were then lowered at an accelerated pace. Foreign investment was restricted by an ever dwindling negative list. The tax regime was gradually made more progressive and rational. 

In the political arena, regular “free” elections were restored. This led to the revival of the old Commonwealth political clans that went into hiatus under Marcos. The regime increasingly tolerated many of Marcos’ political allies, at first in local bailiwicks, then eventually at the national stage. This included the Marcoses and Romualdezes themselves who were allowed to return from exile, after Marcos, Sr. passed away in Hawaii.

Some of the EDSA stalwarts who had fought the dictator survived, for a time. But in the end, they either lost to more traditional political clans, former Marcos loyalists and new dynasties, or got compromised by the system, so much so that the distinction between them and their former opponents was difficult to perceive.

Was it any wonder that after restoring the pre-Martial Law system of politics, the result would be the same old patrimonialism that thrived under that old order? Allegiances were feigned towards whoever was the occupant of Malacanang by members of congress and local governments, to gain maximum advantage. No permanent alliances, only permanent interests.

The political class realised that it was better to collude by forging “unity” - the path of least resistance - to remain in power. Ferdinand Marcos, Jr. despite claiming that the post-EDSA regime had disrupted his father’s grand plan for first world status, had in fact accepted the tenets of its economic philosophy as the basis for his administration.

Having subscribed to it, he saw no need to debate policy with his opponents during his presidential campaign. They were advocating mostly the same things, anyway. His rivals would only use the debate stage as an opportunity to raise the issue of his father’s dark past, which he needed to avoid at all cost. 

At his first address to the joint-sitting of Congress, he surprised many by simply sticking to the policy line of his economic managers. The same high priests who had advised his father, but whose prescriptions went unheeded. Marcos, Jr., for fear of upsetting markets at a precarious post-pandemic period, towed their line.

Neither did he signal any structural break with the past by way of revising the 1987 charter. This was despite hinting that he was for amending it, up until he got elected. Then, he suddenly switched gears and said it was not a priority, dousing the fervour of those who were expecting something more radical from him.

Unlike 1986 when the difference between the Marcos and EDSA regimes were as stark as light and darkness, good and evil, the main differences now had to do with the extent to which three lettered acronyms like PPP ought to be relied on to boost infrastructure spending. They were  marginal, because both sides had actually gravitated towards the middle.

In the end all that Bongbong Marcos could offer was more of the same, only better. In truth, this was all the Filipino public had bargained for. They simply wanted more effective governance than what they had been shown in the past. Better conditions on the ground, rather than lofty ideals based on such abstractions as “democracy” or “people empowerment”. The EDSA regime had offered these in spades, but seemed inept, unable to translate them into reality. 

The Aquinos, having fallen from political grace, were now seen as the enemy. And so as the logic goes, the enemy of my enemy becomes my friend. These were the Marcoses who were able to spin the yarn that things had been better under their watch. Substituting “unity” for “discipline” the mantra of his father, Marcos Jr., was able to provide an antidote to the perennially argumentative, critically divisive and deconstructive attitude of the EDSA forces. Unity required discipline after all.

And in so doing, he was able to foist his own counter-narrative that would explain the past. It was all a lie, the attacks on our family. We hold these hidden truths that the EDSA forces don’t want you to hear. And yet, despite the success of his propaganda, and his victory at the polls, what did the second coming of Marcos herald? Not a break with the previous dispensation.

Though the rejuvenation of the Marcos dynasty signalled a rejection of the formerly ascendant Aquinos and their allies, it didn’t represent a repudiation of the constitutional, political and economic norms they had put in place. Quite the opposite. 

Imitation is the sincerest form of flattery that mediocrity can pay to greatness, so Oscar Wilde said. Maggie Thatcher when asked what her single, greatest achievement was, replied, “Tony Blair and New Labour. We forced our opponents to change their minds.”. So it became with the EDSA regime. Its crowning glory, its finest hour, came not at the apotheosis of the Aquinos, but with the measured return of another Marcos into Malacanang.

A post-pandemic primer on the Philippines

 I recently "sat down" with Cecile from Toronto, the host of a Youtube channel known as CeCe Tee Vee and "The Closet Economist" a former official of the Bangko Sentral who is completing her doctoral studies in Barcelona. 

We discussed the state of the world following Covid-19 and the complex challenges facing the nation as it seeks to rebound from its ill effects. We assessed the capacity of the incoming government of Ferdinand Bongbong Marcos, Jr to address it, and the missed opportunity of electing Isko Moreno whose human-centered economic plans were aimed squarely at our complex challenges.

We concluded with reflections on how to promote transformational thinking and keep the flame of the Iskommunity alive.

This episode streamed live on Philippine Independence Day June 12, 2022. The language spoken is mainly Taglish (a combination of English and Tagalog).

6 Takeaways from the 2022 Philippine Presidential Elections

 

I have 6 takeaways from the election of 2022. Here they are in no particular order:

1. United we stand, divided we fall. 

The unity of the Marcos and Duterte forces sealed the deal, after Sara settled for the vice presidency. They seemed to have heeded the warning of the 1992 elections. In that year, Imelda Marcos and Danding Cojuangco both ran for president, splitting the loyalist vote in the process. Their combined votes outnumbered the eventual winner Fidel Ramos. If they had put up a united slate, then they would have re-taken Malacanang a mere six years after fleeing in haste. If both Sara and Bongbong had stood for the presidency, they might have been defeated by Vice President Robredo. It was not meant to be as the opposition was fragmented and bitterly divided.

2. Automated polling has matured. 

None of the fears of massive cheating materialised. Despite the stalled voting in several polling places due to malfunctioning machines, the vote count and transmission went smoothly for the most part. By Tuesday morning, right after the polls, the results were known. After administering automated polling over five election cycles, the Comelec and its contractor seems to have mastered how to do it effectively and securely.

3. Public opinion polls were right. 

The  pre-election poll results by Pulse Asia, Social Weather Station, and other reputable outfits accurately predicted the outcome of the election. There were few surprises in the night. What happened in 2016 with Duterte coming from behind, in defiance of the polls, may have been a one-off. The science and professionalism of the reputable polling firms has been reaffirmed. 

4. The popularity of Duterte’s government mattered. 

In an age of moral panics and outrage over social problems such as illicit drugs, criminality and moral decay from ideologies based on identity, most voters opted to go for continuity rather than change. A poll conducted prior to the election found that 50 per cent of likely voters preferred a continuation of Duterte’s policies but with a lighter touch. This is where most presidential candidates positioned themselves. 

The vice president herself promised to continue the “war on drugs” but with a different emphasis on treatment. Others were seen as “Duterte-lite”. While they crowded in this lane, a third of all likely voters preferred the unadulterated version of Duterte’s policies. Bongbong had them all to himself. The mere association between Marcos Sr’s martial rule with that of Duterte’s iron fist was enough for voters to equate Marcos Jr with continuity.

5. Change is still coming. 

The seeming opposite of 4, and comically reflective of an episode of Veep, the message “Continuity with Change” was very much in the air. Bongbong stole the opposition’s thunder early on by claiming the mantle of change, while running with the daughter of the incumbent. People still saw the opposition as tired, old, and out of ideas. After 35 years of being scapegoated for the ills of Philippine society, Marcos became reinvented as a break with the narrative of EDSA that had dominated the airwaves and textbooks since 1986.

6. He who controls the past, controls the future; he who controls the present controls the past. 

This Orwellian quote from the novel 1984 is really what this election was fought over. To the victor not only go the spoils of incumbency, but also the pen with which to write, or in Marcos Jr’s case, rewrite history. The Marcoses always suffered a handicap due to the fact that the post-EDSA regime got to tell history from its perspective. Since the election of Duterte in 2016 that narrative has been challenged. Marcos Jr’s loss in 2016 was a kind of blessing in disguise in that he had the luxury of time to build a social media presence to take control of the narrative.

He was able through this to redefine his past and rebrand the Marcoses with a new image that appealed to new voters with no lived experience of his father’s rule. The fact that his opponents condemned it as historical revisionism only raised its mystery and appeal. Once he assumes the presidency, he will have the power to make the Marcoses’ version of events official. And that is perhaps worth more than its weight in gold.

Why the 2022 race needs a third force

In a 1 v 1 match-up Marcos Jr wins, but in a three cornered fight, there is a chance he loses.

Why? Because even if the remaining non-Marcos candidates withdraw in favor of Mrs Robredo, not all their votes go to her, nor will it be enough, since Marcos is polling between 50 and 60 per cent. Leni is partly the reason why he is doing so well. 

Her net satisfaction level is very low, and many voters distrust her. They want to send her a clear message in this election. She spent the last six years being very critical of the administration. At one point, during the height of the Covid crisis, her supporters on social media and in the streets, were calling for the ouster of Duterte.

That is the reason why many are siding with the Marcos scion. There is no way in a two cornered race that she can peel off these voters who support Pres. Rodrigo Duterte’s government to switch to her side. If anything, the votes for Moreno, Lacson and Pacquiao might just go to Marcos Jr, not to the vice president.

Manila Mayor Isko Moreno has attracted most of the organic grassroots leaders from Duterte’s 2016 campaign to support him along with those who supported his senate bid in that year who also formed the base of Sen. Grace Poe’s presidential campaign. Many ordinary swing voters who see his achievements in Manila have also been converted to switch to his side.

This has made him a viable third force. He has actively been courting the support of Duterte’s base with his recent pronouncements on the continuation of the president’s programs, most notably Build, Build, Build. The only question that remains is whether he can convert enough of these voters to switch to his side by the time of the election.

In a three cornered fight where a third candidate has cross over appeal to win some of Pres. Duterte’s base, there could be enough erosion of Marcos Jr’s support to make him lose an electoral majority and become vulnerable. But these Duterte supporters will be hesitant to switch to a third candidate, if it would mean Mrs. Robredo has a chance of winning.

That is why Mayor Isko needs to also demonstrate cross-over appeal to win support from the vice president’s camp. He did this when he issued a statement during the first Comelec hosted debate that he would collect the P203 billion owed by the Marcos estate to the goverment and use the money to provide ‘ayuda’ to ordinary Filipinos.

This is the clearest signal on where he stands regarding the Marcoses. He was careful not to demonize them, but to frame the issue as one of simply implementing an existing Supreme Court ruling that was final and executory.

At least, by staying in the race, Mayor Isko Moreno could weaken the support base of Marcos Jr to the point that some other candidate can win. If he withdraws, it all but guarantees that Marcos would win by a landslide, possibly becoming the first post-EDSA president-elect to win an outright majority of the vote. That is why the 2022 presidential race needs a third force.

Dilawan: Rise and Fall of the EDSA Regime - Vision vs Reality

In this episode we are going to dissect the vision that Ninoy had offered for the Philippines, and delve more  deeply into the early days of the post-EDSA regime to see how this vision was corrupted by the yellow forces.

Dilawan: Rise and Fall of the EDSA Regime - Part 1

PART 1: ORIGIN STORY

From 1986 to 2016, the worldview of the yellow forces in our country dominated the thinking and actions of most Filipinos.

Yellowism or dilawan ideology is a system of moral, political and economic beliefs with normative prescriptions and modalities for regulating and regenerating Philippine society.

It provided a narrative, around which the life of the nation was structured. 

A whole new generation of young Filipinos has been brought up with this belief system.

In 2016, an epoch-making shift took place with the election of Pres. Rody Duterte. To many, this marked the end of the yellow orthodoxy.

In this episode of The Cusp, I’m gonna try to explain what happened. What led to the rise and collapse of the yellow doctrine and the ongoing search for something to replace it.

Videos referred to on the pitfalls of Marcos:
1. Lust for power https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uW4vigtWp08
2-3 Greed and hubris https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WxdvmHDV9cA
4. Might makes right https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XwHLWWGGry8
5. Debt-driven growth strategy https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IbB3DyfFOVg&t=22s

Episode 19: We need bridge builders in the senate

As the homestretch of the campaign approaches, both the Catholic clergy and laypeople have joined the opposition in seeking to block Pres. Duterte's moves to amend the constitution in the next congress during the second half of his term.

It has given rise to the question, what do the times call for? Can there be no middle ground between the ka-DDS and anti-Duterte dilawan groups? What does history tell us about dealing with such a situation?

Back in 1983, the late Sen. Benigno Aquino, Jr. came home from his furlough in the United States to offer Pres. Marcos, his jailer for 7-1/2 years, an olive branch of reconciliation to work towards a modus vivendi or grand bargain. Does his example of seeking to work constructively with his staunch adversary offer lessons as to how the Opposition today can successfully disarm the Duterte administration's creeping authoritarianism?

Get the show notes here.

Episode 8: Can Duterte avoid the pitfalls of Marcos? Part 4

Is the Philippines about to fall into a debt trap under Duterte the way it did under Marcos? This is the fourth in a series called Can Duterte avoid the pitfalls of Marcos? In this installment we look at Marcos' strategy of promoting growth through debt, while extracting maximum personal benefit for himself from it. Vice president Leni Robredo has cautioned Pres. Duterte against falling into this same trap as he contracts loans from China in a bid to lift infrastructure spending. We examine whether her fears have any basis, and discuss ways Duterte can prevent them from happening.

Get the show notes to this podcast here.

Episode 7: Can Duterte avoid the pitfalls of Marcos? Part 3

If Pres. Duterte wants to succeed where Pres. Marcos failed, he will need to avoid certain pitfalls. This series examines what they were and seeks to determine how Duterte can avoid them. This is the third of four parts. In this installment we look at Marcos' misguided use of violence for political ends or "might is right" pitfall. We see whether Duterte has fallen into this same trap in his war on drugs by comparing the death toll of Oplan Tokhang to other anti-narcotic campaigns in Latin America that received tacit and financial support from the United States.

The Blogwatch post mentioned in this episode can be found here.

The opinion piece by Walden Bello referred to in this episode can be found here.

Episode 6: Can Duterte avoid the pitfalls of Marcos? Part 2

If Pres. Duterte wants to succeed where Pres. Marcos failed, he will need to avoid certain pitfalls. This series examines what they were and seeks to determine how Duterte can avoid them. This is the second of three parts.

The article of Tim Kelsall quoted in this podcast is found here.

Episode 5: Can Duterte avoid the pitfalls of Marcos? Part 1

Pres. Duterte imposed Martial Law in Mindanao in May 2017. Observers drew many parallels with Pres. Marcos' own proclamation in September 1971. While many regard Duterte as a dictator in the mold of Marcos, The Cusp examines their similarities as well as their differences, and asks whether Duterte can avoid the pitfalls of Marcos.

Corrupt Yet So Popular

It is quite surprising a phenomenon to witness how that in many countries around the world corrupt leaders often retain public support.

In a recent poll conducted in the Philippines, the late fromer president Corazon Aquino was rated highest by her countrymen among their most loved political leaders (no surprise there), but the man she toppled in a bloodless revolution, Ferdinand Marcos ranked second.

Following in fourth place was the actor turned politician former president Joseph Estrada who was ousted and convicted for his involvement in illegal racketeering. The latter two figured in the top ten most corrupt leaders of the world compiled by the corruption watchdog Transparency International.

The man who topped that list, Mr Suharto, the late former dictator of Indonesia is still widely held in good esteem by his countrymen despite what current media reports suggest about the successful drive against corruption there. What makes these crooked leaders so well-loved among their poor countrymen long after their demise? Is it their charisma? Perhaps. Is it a sense of nostalgia? For what? Is there something that these corrupt leaders attend to quite effectively that honest leaders fail to do?

The answer to that last question is most definitely a yes. What they do is support a system of clientelism to enough of their constituents so that in their eyes, the means through which such patronage is dispensed becomes irrelevant in a country where governments fail to provide an adequate level of support to their populace.

The phenomenon is in no way limited to developing countries. In an advanced economy such as Italy where people still prefer to contract with each other based on personal ties rather than through impersonal markets, their current prime minister Silvio Berlusconi, who has been hit by sex and corruption scandals, seems to retain wide popular support.

It took the global recession for the long-dominant ruling party of Japan to be booted out in last year's election. The new government vowed to take down the all-powerful triad led by the civil service along with members of the political and business elite who in the past have so successfully colluded to steer the economy in the right direction, but whose complacency was now holding the country back, so it claimed.

Even in countries where impersonal contracting has taken over as a result of a strong judicial system and where governments are adequately resourced, political parties are often found to engage in unsavoury practices. In Illinois for instance, the former governor tried to sell the vacated senate seat of President Barack Obama. One can find instances of such wheeling and dealing in local politics perhaps where such personalistic contracting can still be performed.

A recent Gallup poll in the US found trust in government to be at a low. Ever since the Vietnam War and Watergate scandal that toppled President Nixon, the trust rating has gone down from the previous highs registered since the “New Deal” era of President Franklin Roosevelt.

Many attribute this low rating to the gridlock and extreme partisanship that goes on in Washington. Yet despite these sentiments, polarising and highly partisan figures such as former Alaskan governor and vice presidential contender Sarah Palin retain immense popularity. This is probably due to the fact that they are able to connect with their party base by delivering the “red meat” in terms of policy prescriptions.

In other words, in Western democracies, instances of patron-client relations involving the exchange of tangible goods can still be found within governments and political parties, but it is replaced by and large with principle-based policy back-scratching that appeals to the lowest common denominator among their most loyal constituents.