A plutarchy with populist tendencies

The title of this piece is inspired by Prof. Yuen Yuen Ang’s take on how China escaped the poverty trap. Ang argues that despite one party rule, China was able to forge merit-based mechanisms of accountability that led to its development. She describes it as an “autocracy with democratic characteristics”.

The Beijing Consensus refers to the political economy instituted by the People’s Republic under Deng Xiaoping, after Mao’s death in 1976. It is an alternate path to development, sitting in contrast to the failed Russian Soviet experiment with a command economy and all its inherent inefficiency, unwieldiness and poor incentives.

Under the China model, Beijing sets national economic policy through its five year plans. It then assigns to regional counterparts the task of meeting these targets through a “franchise-like” system. Each local government uses its own connections (“guanxi”) to attract investment to contribute to the the national goal under a process of “directed improvisation”.

Promotion within Communist party is based on performing well against official targets, relative to peers. Individuals rising to the highest policy-making body, the Politburo standing committee, prove themselves in towns and villages first, then at cities and regional levels.

The central government, in giving agency to regional executives, is able to keep its “distance” from local politics and avoid blame when their administration fails, due to ineptitude or corruption. It can overrule or interfere with local affairs, if public outcry reaches the capital. This is what gives the autocratic state some form of democratic accountability.

Beijing adapted local customs to mimic Western institutions that foster open competition within a marketplace of ideas. Instead of inter-party competition, the Chinese have created internal tournaments within the ruling party. They follow through on long-range plans, without disruption from corruptible, short-term election cycles that occur in developing states.

The Philippines has been characterised as a cacique democracy, from its inception in the 1890s with local and national politics dominated by a small set of wealthy, well-connected families. Even with American “tutelage” in democracy, participation in politics was largely confined to those with political pedigree and deep pockets.

A lack of policy consensus after independence from the 1950s to 1970s ensued leading to boom and bust cycles. Since EDSA ‘86, multiparty democracy is seen as chaotic, with limited participation and increasing concentration of power even within the partylist system.

But there has been considerable policy continuity in economic affairs since EDSA. This has led to increased rates of economic growth with greater capacity to handle internal contradictions of a market-based system, namely the disparity by which its spoils are shared.

Developmental spending enables political families to retain legitimacy. They are slowly moving away from direct forms of patronage to programmatic, institutional responses to poverty and other challenges. The evidence? … Free college, universal health care coverage and public school feeding programs, cash transfers to poor families, senior citizen benefits, among others.

Rivalry among political families has created conditions that mimic democratic accountability, stealing the thunder from progressive movements. Chief executives act as family figures making government seem near and personal.

Apo Marcos, Tita Cory, Steady Eddie, Pareng Erap, Ate Glo, PNoy and Tatay Digong were personages meant to instill a sense of filial piety in the nation through pakikisama and bayanihan, the illusion that we are all part of an “imagined community” despite our regional, ethnic differences.

The Philippines may thus be regarded as a plutarchy with populist tendencies. The adoption of democratic forms of governance without the institutions performing their function, has given rise to political dynasties. Through local customs, the Philippines has begun to develop a consensus for economic growth and development under a market-based system.

This has led to increased concentration of economic and political capital. To retain legitimacy, actors voluntarily initiate populist programs that increasingly rely on fiscal space afforded by growth to fund them, sustainably. This constitutes an alternate path to development, which might be dubbed the Manila Consensus.